
MAINSTREAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY IN FRANCE

EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND
SOCIAL COHESION INITIATIVES



MAINSTREAMING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY IN FRANCE: EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION INITIATIVES

Angéline Escafré-Dublet

August 2014

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank all those who participated in interviews for this case study. Particular thanks go to Milica Petrovic for her helpful comments on earlier versions of this report and to Rameez Abbas for her careful edits.

This report, part of a research project supported by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, is one of four country reports on mainstreaming: Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. MPI Europe thanks key partners in this research project, Peter Scholten from Erasmus University and Ben Gidley from Compas, Oxford University.

© 2014 Migration Policy Institute Europe.
All Rights Reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from MPI Europe. A full-text PDF of this document is available for free download from www.mpieurope.org.

Information for reproducing excerpts from this report can be found at www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copyright-policy. Inquiries can also be directed to communications@migrationpolicy.org.

Suggested citation: Escafré-Dublet, Angéline. 2014. *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France: Education, Employment, and Social Cohesion Initiatives*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
<i>A. Integration policy in France</i>	1
<i>B. Do general youth policies reach those of immigrant origin?</i>	1
<i>C. Assessing mainstreaming in France</i>	2
I. INTRODUCTION	2
<i>A. An overview of immigration trends</i>	2
<i>B. Immigrant integration: An administrative overview</i>	4
<i>C. Mainstreaming integration policy: To what extent and how deliberate?</i>	5
<i>D. Youth as the central focus of integration policies</i>	7
<i>E. Methodology</i>	7
II. TARGETING WITHIN MAINSTREAMING: DOES YOUTH POLICY REACH THOSE OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN?	8
<i>A. Educational policy</i>	8
<i>B. Employment policy</i>	11
<i>C. Social cohesion policy</i>	14
III. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING MAINSTREAMING IN FRANCE	15
WORKS CITED	17
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	19

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

France is home to one of the highest proportions of immigrant descendants in Europe. This report surveys their integration into French society, focusing on programmes that seek to support their education, employment, and inclusion in society. The task is a difficult one: Official statistics record only nationality, and most children of immigrants born in France hold French citizenship. This ends up statistically concealing ‘immigrant youth’ from scientific analysis. Moreover, there is a general distrust of policies that target a particular group over others—a distrust that originates from the republican principle of equal treatment regardless of origin, religion, or race.

There is a general distrust of policies that target a particular group over others.

A. *Integration policy in France*

Immigrant integration programmes are the official responsibility of the Interior Ministry and are designed to serve newcomers (officially defined as people who have been in the country fewer than five years). The main institution in charge of integration in the Interior Ministry is the Office for Integration, Reception, and Citizenship (Direction de l'accueil, de l'intégration, et de la citoyenneté, or DAIC). DAIC manages integration programmes for legal newcomers, many of whom are young immigrants.

The fact that integration initiatives are limited to an immigrant's first five years in France implies mainstreaming: after those initial years, immigrants' integration needs are addressed through general policies, in particular area-based policies that target disadvantaged neighbourhoods with a high proportion of foreign born.

Immigrant integration is therefore also addressed by the Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (l'Agence pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances, or Acsé), a central agency that operates under the guidance of the City Ministry. The City Ministry implements the ‘city policy’, which consists in allocating more means to disadvantaged areas.

B. *Do general youth policies reach those of immigrant origin?*

This report investigates how the implementation of French integration policy affects young immigrants and descendants of immigrants. It is based on a literature review and a series of interviews with administrative officials in both the Interior and the City Ministries. It concentrates on three areas of public intervention:

- **Education.** The French Ministry of Education is generally reluctant to target descendants of immigrants. Language instruction for new arrivals is the only immigrant-centred project considered to be legitimate. The City Ministry implements Education Achievement Programmes in disadvantaged areas. Here, it offers extra help to pupils outside school and seeks to reduce social inequality. It is not clear, however, how immigrant youth are targeted through these programmes or how many have been brought within their purview.
- **Employment.** While public services cannot legally target French people of immigrant descent, programmes seek to address the specific issues they may encounter in the workplace, such as discrimination in recruiting or career evolution. Policymakers have implemented incentive tools, such as the Diversity Label, created in 2008 and managed in part by DAIC. This tool provides an organisation (public or private) with a thorough audit of its human resource practises. It grants the organisation the Diversity Label or suggests changes to its practises.
- **Social cohesion.** Acsé relies heavily on nongovernmental actors to implement programmes that foster social cohesion. More specifically, it works to increase human resources in local community associations and neighbourhoods through various schemes of subsidised employment contracts. These include Relay Adults (*adultes relais*), which recruit unemployed adults to serve as facilitators in neighbourhoods, and FONJEP (Fonds de

coopération de la jeunesse et de l'éducation populaire), which finances permanent positions in community outreach associations. While FONJEP seeks to engage young people with an immigrant background, there is no indicator of its success other than the high percentage of immigrants in the disadvantaged areas it serves.

C. *Assessing mainstreaming in France*

The report shows that a recent institutional reorganisation—both Acsé and DAIC were once overseen by the Social Affairs Ministry—has in effect mainstreamed those policies and programmes that before focused specifically on immigrants. While budget cuts have impacted both institutions' capacity to act, the more important change is that the rise of an area-based approach to issues pertaining to social inequality has undermined their ability to tackle issues that are specific to the experience of immigrant youth, particularly with regards to discrimination.

At the local level, however, organisations that work with immigrant youth (notably in the field of access to employment) are able to cope with this constraint and to gather various types of financial support (sometimes from both Acsé and DAIC).

The ability to address the specific needs of immigrant youth depends on how actors cope with their institutional constraints. Service providers and administrative officials need to do more to understand the challenge of discrimination experienced by immigrant youth—and the institutional mechanisms that are effective in overcoming this challenge.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. *An overview of immigration trends*

Immigration has been a constant feature of French society since the 19th century. In 1881, 2.7 per cent of the French population was foreign; by 1931 that number had risen to 6.6 per cent. Although many foreigners naturalised after the World War II, postwar migration flows more than replenished their numbers.

The proportion of the foreign born stabilised to 7.5 per cent in 1975 and then rose to 8.5 per cent in 2008.¹ Algeria, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, and Spain have long sent the most immigrants to France, but inflows have diversified over the past 30 years to include more migrants from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1999 and 2009, the share of sub-Saharan African immigrants rose from 10 per cent to 17 per cent of total inflows.²

The legal impediment against the collection of ethnic data in the official statistical system makes it difficult to measure the level of diversity in France.

France's foreign-born population—at 11.6 per cent of the total population in 2013—is comparable to that of other European countries.³ Yet there is a marked difference: immigrants arrived earlier in France, and their flows have recently diminished compared to those of other destination countries. The result is that France is home to one of the highest proportions of immigrant descendants in Europe.⁴

1 Gérard Bouvier, 'Les descendants d'immigrés plus nombreux que les immigrés: une position française originale en Europe', in *Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France* (Paris: Insee Références, 2012), www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/ref/IMMFRA12_b_VE_posfra.pdf.

2 David Lessault and Cris Beauchemin, 'Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe: Still a Limited Trend', *Population and Societies* 452, no. 1 (2009): 1–4.

3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *International Migration Outlook 2013* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), www.oecd.org/els/mig/imo2013.htm.

4 Bouvier, 'Les descendants d'immigrés'.

The legal impediment against the collection of ethnic data in the official statistical system makes it difficult to measure the level of diversity in France.⁵ Nationality is the only information recorded in the census and available to the administration. Since children of immigrants born in France automatically become French citizens when they turn 18, only young immigrants born abroad appear as ‘immigrant youth’ in official data (there are 1.2 million foreign born, between 18 and 35 years old, or 2 per cent of the total population).

The absence of information on individual origins stems from the French republican understanding of equality and the reluctance to recognise any criteria other than nationality as a legitimate basis of distinction. From 1886, when nationality was introduced in the census, it was the only criteria used to categorise individual origins (as opposed to place of birth or ethnicity). This changed in 1999, when a distinction between French by birth and French by naturalisation was introduced, sparking intense debate.⁶ Critics argue that any criteria of distinction other than nationality run counter to republican ideals. Social scientists, meanwhile, are frustrated by the dearth of accurate data on ethnic discrimination and the efficacy of antidiscrimination policies. Identifying people’s origin and ethnicity remains difficult in the French context.

Despite the challenges of collecting such data, the recent Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey⁷ estimated that 1.5 million French people under the age of 30 have at least one foreign-born parent. Thus the ‘migrant youth population’—encompassing the first and second generations—amounts to 2.7 million people, or 4 per cent of the total population of 64 million.

The TeO survey maps out the features of French-born descendants of immigrants:⁸ In 2008, 3.1 million descendants of immigrants ages 18 to 50 were living in France—comprising 12 per cent of the French population. Fifty per cent had a parent born in Europe, and 40 per cent a parent born in Africa (mainly the Maghreb). The younger the person, however, the more likely he or she was to have a parent born in sub-Saharan Africa. Sixty per cent of second-generation immigrants who had at least one parent from sub-Saharan Africa were under 26. Descendants of immigrants were concentrated in the same areas as recent immigrants, namely Paris (30 per cent) and the southeast of France (16 per cent). This may be due in part to a lack of resources and a low level of social mobility.⁹ The geographical concentration of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa was even higher than the average: 65 per cent lived in Paris.

Box 1. The Reception and Integration Contract (*Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration*)

The 2007 *Law on Immigration, Integration, and Asylum (Loi du 20 novembre 2007 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration, et l'asile)* introduced the Reception and Integration Contract, which is supervised by the National Office for Immigration and Integration (Office français de l'intégration et de l'immigration, OFII). OFII is based in Paris and has 53 offices around the country as well as eight offices in sending countries (Cameroon, Canada, Mali, Morocco, Turkey, Senegal, and Tunisia).

By signing the Reception and Integration Contract, all newly arrived immigrants with a legal status commit to learning French and becoming familiar with French laws. The renewal of their residence permit is dependent on their commitment to fulfil this contract.

All contracts are individualised during a meeting with the applicant, at which OFII officials estimate the number of language lessons required and whether or not applicants are in need of complementary training.

Source: L' Office français de l'intégration et de l'immigration, 'Le CAI: le contrat d'accueil et d'intégration. Un engagement réciproque entre le Migrant et la République', accessed 8 August 2014, www.ofii.fr/accueil_8/le_cai_le_contrat_d_accueil_et_d_integration_un_engagement_reciproque_entre_le_migrant_et_la_republique_984.html.

5 Patrick Simon, 'The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France', *French Politics, Culture and Society* 26, no. 1 (2008): 7–31.

6 Patrick Simon, 'Nationality and Origins in French Statistics: Ambiguous Categories', *Population: An English Selection* 11 (1999): 193–219.

7 National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), 'Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO)', Paris, http://teo_english.site.ined.fr/.

8 Catherine Borrel and Bertrand Lhommeau, 'Être né en France d'un parent immigré' (paper no. 1287, Insee Première, Paris, March 2010), www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/ipweb/ip1287/ip1287.pdf.

9 Bouvier, 'Les descendants d'immigrés'.

B. Immigrant integration: An administrative overview

Immigrant integration as a category of public intervention in France has changed over the past five years. Today, immigrant integration programmes are the official responsibility of the Interior Ministry and are designed to serve newcomers (that is, people who have been in the country fewer than five years). From 1965 to 2007 integration programmes were the responsibility of the Social Affairs Ministry. Then, in 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy created a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity that combined the competences of three ministries: Foreign Affairs (for the management of migrant flows and the question of refugee rights), Interior (for border control and the naturalisation process), and Social Affairs (for integration). He also instated a Reception and Integration Contract (*Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration*) for immigrants to sign upon their arrival, strongly linking integration issues to newcomers' reception.

The Ministry of Immigration and National Identity ceased to exist in 2010; today immigrant integration is the competence of the Interior Ministry. In 2012 Interior Minister Manuel Valls (2012-14) announced his intention to restrict the Ministry's intervention to the reception of newcomers (namely the funding of language classes) and to disperse responsibilities across various departments.¹⁰ Such changes in definition and Ministry responsibility have impacted the development of integration policies.

The way forward is uncertain. The author's interview with an integration advisor to the Interior Minister suggests that the left-wing government of Francois Hollande intends to depart from the right-wing policies of the Sarkozy government, including the previous administration's restrictive stance on immigration issues.¹¹ The advisor mentioned that the Interior Minister does not believe that integration (other than the funding of language classes) should be a competency of the Interior Ministry. The advisor was in the process of drafting a proposal for a more dispersed approach to integration that involved delegating responsibilities across relevant bodies (such as education, employment, housing, and health departments).

The concept of 'mainstreaming' integration may affect discourse, policies, and governance structures. In the case of France, it seems likely that governance structures will be affected in this regard under the Hollande administration.

Mainstreaming policies will also be necessary, however. Under current interpretations of the French Republican ideal of equality, political actors and administrative officials may be uncomfortable specifically addressing immigrant groups. Government ministries, too, avoid targeting immigrants.

The main institution in charge of integration in the Interior Ministry is the Office for Integration, Reception and Citizenship (Direction de l'accueil, de l'intégration et de la citoyenneté, or DAIC). DAIC manages integration programmes for legal newcomers (about 100,000 per year), many of whom are young immigrants (the average age is 31) and about half of whom are married to a French resident. Fifty-five percent of new arrivals are women.

DAIC manages language programmes, access to housing, and employment. When DAIC was created in 2007, 60 per cent of the administrative staff came from the Interior Ministry and 40 per cent from the Social Affairs Ministry.¹² Most of the officials from the Social Affairs Ministry had previously been employed in the Population and Migration Office (Direction des populations et des migrations) that was in charge of immigrant populations since 1965. Therefore, the expertise (and concern) of the administrative officials previously employed in the Population and Migration Office, now working in the DAIC, tends to extend beyond the five-year definition of the current integration policy.¹³

Immigrant integration is also addressed by the Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (l'Agence pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances, or Acsé), a central agency that works closely with prefects. Even though integration is not the official responsibility of Acsé, this institution has long worked with the immigrant populations who tend to be highly concentrated in the disadvantaged areas it serves.

Acsé descends from a funding initiative that specifically targeted immigrants and their families. From 1958 to 2001 this was called the Social Action Fund (Fonds d'action sociale, or FAS);¹⁴ it was then relabelled the Social Action Fund for Integration and Anti-Discrimination (Fonds d'action sociale pour l'intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations, or FASILD) from 2001 to 2005, when it became Acsé. These changes in name reflect changes in political

10 Interview with a technical advisor to the Interior Minister, 23 April 2013.

11 Ibid.

12 Interview with the DAIC Director of Reception, Integration, and Prevention of Discrimination, 26 April 2013.

13 The naturalisation process requires that applicants justify their legal residence in France after five years. However, in practise, most immigrants apply for naturalisation after 10 to 15 years.

14 Amelia Lyons, 'Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonisation in France: The Case of the Fonds d'Action Sociale', *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, no. 1 (2009): 65-89.

orientation and organisation. Notably, Acsé is no longer assigned to the immigrant population, and instead works within the City Ministry (Ministère délégué à la Ville), which focuses on reducing territorial inequality.

Although DAIC and Acsé are two different types of institutions (DAIC is a central government office, while Acsé is an umbrella agency with delegates in French regions) working under two different ministries (DAIC belongs to the Interior Ministry, Acsé belongs to the City Ministry), the two organisations do complementary work. DAIC provides for the integration of newcomers in France, and Acsé develops programmes that—while not targeted—disproportionately affect people of immigrant descent.

While both agencies are administered centrally, they have local representation throughout the French territory. Meanwhile, local city councils approach integration policy in their own ways. The city of Lille has been at the forefront of experimenting with an area-based approach to inequalities in the framework of ‘City Policies’. Marseille, a historical melting pot, employs a conflict-resolution approach (for example, by creating the Marseille Esperance, an informal group of community leaders who address conflicts between various religious communities, and by fighting criminality and drug trafficking in the northern neighbourhoods of the city). The top-down approach of DAIC and Acsé does not always match the bottom-up needs of local associations and the guidelines of city governments. However, the creation of ‘equal opportunity prefects’ to implement the state’s equal opportunity policy at the local level promises to enhance dialogue between the national agencies and local-level administrators.

French integration policy relies on private initiatives, such as organisations involved in humanitarian relief...and those focused on immigrants.

Two-thirds of DAIC’s budget is dedicated to the functioning of the National Office for Immigration and Integration (Office français de l’intégration et de l’immigration, or OFII), which is where newly arrived immigrants come to sign their integration contracts, and 60 million euros go to language classes. Meanwhile, Acsé allocates funds to nonprofit organisations (including local community initiatives; large, established nongovernmental organisations [NGOs]; and semi-public organisations) to develop programmes. For 2013 the total budget of Acsé was 319 million euros, of which 90 per cent was spent at the local level through bureaus of regional or departmental prefects.

French integration policy relies on private initiatives, such as organisations involved in humanitarian relief (e.g., the Red Cross) and those focused on immigrants (e.g., the Federation of Associations of Solidarity with Migrant Workers [Fédération des Associations de Solidarité avec les Travailleurs Immigrés, or FASTI]¹⁵ and La Cimade).¹⁶ The case of integration policies in France is therefore an interesting exception to the traditional Tocquevillian opposition between the French and Anglo-Saxon models: it contradicts the well-entrenched idea that the French state does not leave much room for private initiatives.

However, the French institutional structure greatly influences the work of associations and the ability of immigrant-based organisations to defend their interests.¹⁷ The extensive welfare state (which provides housing in particular) leads citizens to expect public intervention. Meanwhile, immigrant efforts to self-organize are often met with official suspicion. Even as private and nongovernmental organizations participate in immigrant integration, the state is predominant.

C. Mainstreaming integration policy: To what extent and how deliberate?

The fact that integration initiatives are limited to an immigrant’s first five years in France implies mainstreaming: after those initial years, an immigrant’s integration needs are addressed through general policies. It is difficult to assess whether this state of affairs is due to budgetary constraints or a desire to spread the responsibility for integration across government departments.

As responsibilities for integration are dispersed, administrative officials complain of a lack of resources. The DAIC lost

¹⁵ FASTI, www.fasti.org.

¹⁶ La Cimade, www.lacimade.org.

¹⁷ Patrick Ireland, *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

a significant portion of its budget for integration in 2007,¹⁸ making it harder for administrative officials there to convince other central administrations to take up the issue of integration.¹⁹ A lack of leverage resulting from budget cuts is also a challenge for Acsé. According to an administrator:

When you are sitting at a table with representatives from different areas of public intervention, it is hard to raise the concern of the immigrant population. And it is especially hard, when you do not have the relevant budget, and when nobody feels obliged to provide to this specific population.²⁰

At the same time, administrative officials observe that a more targeted approach would have its own pitfalls. When a specific service is dedicated to immigrants, other agencies are less likely to address the issue. The technical advisor to the Interior Ministry argued that integration and diversity are concerns that affect the entire society and should involve the focus of many—if not all—government departments. In her words, mainstreaming integration is a deliberate and progressive way to address a changing society.

For mainstreaming efforts to succeed, a specific administrative structure—whether a steering committee or a bureau—should ensure collaboration across all relevant departments. Such a structure may function along the lines of the ‘gender mainstreaming’ unit that often exists in international organisations (such as in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]). Administrative officials contend that the Interministerial Committee on Integration, in operation from 2003 to 2006, was useful. Without such a committee, coordination can be difficult. Acsé staff, for example, cited difficulties knowing which ministries were conducting initiatives relevant to integration. A steering committee could also be in charge of centralizing information. Whether such an agency will be implemented in the French case remains unknown, but according to the author’s interview with an advisor to the Interior Ministry, coordination at the level of the prime minister’s office is moving in this direction.

A shift from immigrant- to area-based efforts is an example of mainstreaming integration policy. Acsé was established with a focus on particular neighbourhoods after the 2005 riots in the French suburbs, as central-level decision makers realized that the implementation of government programmes was not visible at the local level. After this, the government decided to manage social inequality in a more targeted way, and called upon the resources of the City Ministry to conduct and monitor locally based projects.

Acsé focuses its efforts on select disadvantaged neighbourhoods, referred to as Priority Neighbourhoods (currently 2,500 neighbourhoods qualify as such). While there is a high concentration of immigrants and descendants of immigrants in these neighbourhoods,²¹ there are no precise data on their numbers,²² so only rough estimations are possible.²³ Better data are available for newly arrived immigrants, of whom 60 per cent live outside of Priority Neighbourhoods²⁴ and therefore outside the reach of Acsé programmes. Meanwhile, the 2,500 Priority Neighbourhoods are being downsized to 1,300 to increase the concentration of resources in highly disadvantaged areas. Up until now Priority Neighbourhoods were selected using criteria such as unemployment data, the proportion of social housing, income, and number of youth. This has been reduced to one measure—poverty levels—and includes rural areas as of June 2014. This shift promises to exclude many immigrants and their descendents, concentrated as they are in particular urban neighbourhoods.

A similar shift in focus occurred in the Priority Education Zone policy, which lasted from 1981 to 2007.²⁵ This policy was implemented by the Education Ministry and targeted public schools in disadvantaged areas. These schools received more resources, and the educational staff who worked in them gained extra benefits. In 2007 the policy was revised and relabelled in order to focus on a selection of schools experiencing a high level of difficulties. In this sense it was a forerunner of the current Priority Neighbourhood revision in that it directed resources to certain schools, and left others out of the scheme. The selected French public schools are now labeled ‘Aim for Success’ schools (*Etablissements ambition réussite*) and maintain an area-based approach to social inequality.

The area-based approach to inequality in France originates from the republican principle of equal treatment regardless

18 An interviewee estimated the loss to be 100 million euros.

19 Interview with a DAIC official, 26 April 2013.

20 Interview with the Acsé Director for Social Cohesion Programmes, 17 April 2013.

21 Darès, ‘Habiter en ZUS et être immigré: un double risque sur le marché du travail’, *Premières Informations et Premières Synthèses* 48, no. 1 (2009): 6.

22 Interviews with the Acsé Director for Education Programmes, Acsé Director for Employment Programmes, and Acsé Director for Social Cohesion Programmes, April 2013.

23 One Programme Officer estimated that 80 per cent of the people reached are descendants of immigrants.

24 Interview with a DAIC official, 26 April 2013.

25 Dominique Glasman, *Des Zones d’Education Prioritaires aux Réseaux d’Education Prioritaire: Pratiques et politiques* (Toulouse: Editions SEDRAP, 2000).

of origin, religion, or race.²⁶ There is general distrust of policy that targets a particular group over others. One exception was the FAS, a dedicated fund that supported immigrant associations from 1958 to 2007 with the aim of addressing the housing and social integration issues faced by new immigrants. Until 1983, half of the FAS budget was allocated to the building and maintenance of dedicated housing structures (the *foyers* that hosted male immigrant workers). The rest of the budget was used for various literacy and social promotion programmes. After 1983, the portion of the budget dedicated to the social and cultural promotion of immigrants and their families increased.

However, even this exception to French practices ceased to exist when Acsé was put under the oversight of the City Ministry. With the establishment of Acsé, the government sought to develop a policy of equal opportunity that applied to all French citizens regardless of origin.

D. Youth as the central focus of integration policies

French integration policy, focused as it is on new arrivals, reaches mostly young immigrants (as noted earlier, the average age of newly arrived immigrants is 31). Acsé, meanwhile, reaches those young descendants of immigrants who are concentrated in the disadvantaged areas it serves. Acsé also coordinates with the Regional Offices for Youth, Sports, and Social Cohesion (Directions régionales de la jeunesse, des sports, et de la cohésion sociale). French integration policy thus impacts youth,²⁷ and involves intervention in three main areas:

- **Education.** DAIC provides language classes to newly arrived immigrants, and helps them gain recognition for diplomas acquired abroad (including through the ENIC-NARIC initiative, together with the Education Ministry).²⁸ Acsé fosters tutoring, parent/teacher dialogues, and cultural activities for at-risk youth.²⁹
- **Employment.** DAIC helps newly arrived immigrants access the labour market by providing skills evaluation, liaising with the French unemployment agency, and targeting specific employers such as construction and cleaning companies. DAIC also monitors the Diversity Label, which seeks to fight discrimination in the workplace.³⁰ (When Acsé was created in 2007, the competence over antidiscrimination policy was transferred to DAIC.) Acsé's employment-related activities consist of guiding individuals who are excluded from the job market because of their geographical location or lack of diplomas. It is interesting to note that both DAIC and Acsé seek to stimulate business creation; immigrants are more likely to be entrepreneurs than are natives.³¹
- **Social cohesion.** This is the exclusive competence of Acsé. Although Acsé predominantly finances community associations that organise cultural activities at the neighbourhood level or are involved in conflict resolution, its action remit is formally linked to youth policy since it coexists in the same office (as Direction de la jeunesse, du lien social et de la vie associative).

Overall, youth as a focus of public intervention exceeds the portfolio of the Youth Ministry or Acsé. Supporting youth is therefore understood as a 'transversal' competence, rather than a dedicated area of public intervention.

E. Methodology

This report investigates how the implementation of French integration policy affects young immigrants and descendants of immigrants. It concentrates on three areas of public intervention: education, employment, and social cohesion. It is based on a literature review and a series of interviews with six administrative officials.

26 1958 Constitution of the French Republic, Article I.

27 This is also reflected by the fact that DAIC has a specific competency and a specific budget for elderly immigrants (most of them retired immigrant workers who still live in *foyers*).

28 ENIC-NARIC stands for the European Network of Information Centres—National Academic Recognition Information Centres, www.ciep.fr/enic-naricfr/.

29 L'Acsé, *Programme des interventions, adopté par le CA de l'Acsé lors de la séance du 20 décembre 2012* (Paris: Ministère délégué à la ville, 2013), http://transferts.lacse.fr/PI_VF_BD_avec_couv.pdf.

30 Ministère de l'Intérieur, *Le label diversité* (Paris: Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2013), www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Integration/Emploi-et-promotion-de-la-diversite/Le-label-diversite.

31 Interview with the Acsé Director for Employment and Economic Development, 17 April 2013.

Of the officials interviewed, three work in Acsé and two in DAIC. One political advisor to the Interior Ministry cabinet was selected to provide a better idea of the orientation of French policy. This advisor's previous work experience at Acsé (formerly FAS) was also enlightening. Among the three men and three women interviewed, all were senior civil servants who had worked on issues pertaining to integration, education, or employment for several years and had a long-term view of policy development.

The interviews lasted 45 to 75 minutes each; questions touched on how integration policy was expressed in programme implementation, how programmes reached immigrants, and the extent to which they did so deliberately. The interviews focused on the changes in political orientation and the definition of integration over the past five years.

Answers were analysed using the theory of path dependency: current decisions are based on decisions made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant.³² In the case of integration policy and the targeting of immigrant youth, actors are greatly influenced by past collaborations at national and local levels, as well as their own career paths. Officials who started their career in the City Ministry have mainly been in charge of dealing with geographic inequality and are less concerned with targeting immigrant populations. By contrast, officials who started their career in the Ministry of Social Affairs are more likely to be concerned with immigrants.

The interviews also helped identify relevant actors at the local level, particularly in cities with a high concentration of immigrants: Lille, Lyon, and Marseille. Some of these regional actors are administrative contacts at the prefect level; others are leading organisations that, according to interviewees, reach immigrant youth in their activities and receive a combination of financial support from various institutions (sometimes, both Acsé and DAIC).

II. TARGETING WITHIN MAINSTREAMING: DOES YOUTH POLICY REACH THOSE OF IMMIGRANT ORIGIN?

First- and second-generation immigrant youth are the target of integration programmes in the overlapping fields of education, employment, and social cohesion. Although the number of second-generation immigrant youth who benefit from these programmes is difficult to estimate, the following three sections outline policy orientation, specific constraints, budget allocations, and specific initiatives in each field.

A. *Educational policy*

1. The Ministry of Education

The French Ministry of Education is reluctant to target descendants of immigrants. Specific integration programmes are designed for children of newly arrived migrants who need to learn the French language. Initiation classes (*classes d'initiation*, or CLIN) serve newly arrived migrant children in primary school (38,100 of whom attended classes in 2010-11), and reception classes (*classes d'accueil*, or CLA) serve children in secondary or high school.³³ A reception unit (*cellule d'accueil*)—based at the level of the *département* or regional education headquarters—assesses new arrivals' French ability and educational levels, and if necessary, sends them to initiation or reception classes. Such classes, funded by the Ministry of Education, are to be found in select schools located in areas with concentrated immigrant populations.

32 Bruno Palier and Guliano Bonoli, 'Phénomènes de Path Dependence et réformes des systèmes de protection sociale', *Revue française de science politique* 49, no. 3 (1999): 399-420.

33 Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, 'Les élèves nouveaux arrivants non francophones' (Note d'information [informative note] no. 12-01, Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, Paris, March 2012), http://cache.media.education.gouv.fr/file/2012/53/2/DEPP-NI-2012-01-eleves-nouveaux-arrivants-non-francophones_209532.pdf.

These schemes are temporary (children spend one year in these classes) and aim to help pupils join mainstream classes as soon as possible. A 2002 report observed that the implementation of these classes was heterogeneous at the local level, which could be explained by the uncertainty regarding migration flows as well as the fact that these classes were often created *ad hoc* and based on various interpretations of the relevant legislation.³⁴ Other than language classes, the French Ministry of Education does not run any programmes addressing issues specific to pupils with an immigrant background.

Ethnicity-based social stratification and stigmatisation are the main reasons given for the absence of proactive policies targeting immigrant youth. Not surprisingly, the Education Ministry has been at the forefront of the area-based approach to social inequality, with the creation of the Priority Education Zone in 1984, relabeled the ‘Aiming to Succeed’ schools in 2007. The initiative directs resources to these schools; it does not aim to tackle inequalities stemming from ethnic, cultural, or religious differences.

Assessing how well the geography-based approach addresses the specific needs of the descendants of immigrants is particularly difficult since the Ministry does not issue any cross-sectional data on achievement by nationality or immigrant background. Most data on the educational attainment of first- and second-generation immigrants has been collected by outside surveys. So far, the main findings are that children of immigrants make more progress in school than do children of natives³⁵ and that any poor results correlate more to parents’ socioeconomic condition than to ethnic origin.³⁶ The TeO survey reveals that pupils mainly identify instances of discrimination in curriculum counseling.³⁷ However, these analyses do not provide us with sufficient details to evaluate the specific programmes set up to reduce inequality in educational attainment. The collected data are aggregated into groups of 50,000 in order to comply with the legal impediment that affects the collection of ethnic data in France. It is not possible to identify in which schools or areas these individuals are located.

2. The educational achievement programme managed by Acsé

While the Ministry of Education focuses more on curriculum development and the functioning of schools, the City Ministry offers extra help to pupils outside school, seeks to reduce social inequality, and targets specific disadvantaged areas entitled *zones urbaines sensibles*. Acsé is the main provider of Educational Achievement Programmes (Programmes de réussite éducative, PREs).

a) Educational Achievement Programmes

PREs seek to individualise policy responses to social inequality. They aim to identify pupils who encounter difficulties in schools and provide support tailored to their specific needs. The contact point for a programme is usually a project officer in charge of education policies in the local government (most often the city administration), who may be contacted by a school administrator identifying a struggling student. The programme officer can only intervene when all general programmes fail to support this specific pupil. The PRE is an additional, *ad hoc* policy that is not supposed to replace common policy.

PREs engage multiple competences outside the education sphere (such as health, culture, sports, etc.). The contact point in the local administration may facilitate a dialogue between the family of the pupil and the school, redirect the pupil to athletic or cultural group activities that are already set up, and, if necessary, contact the health services of the city. The goal is to prevent students from dropping out of the school system (*décrochage scolaire*). However, an interviewee in a city outside Paris observed that even though the programmes are designed to be *preventive*, they are more often than not *remedial*, because the service is often invoked in difficult situations, when social relief services are too busy to address the issue.³⁸

34 Anne Lecourbe, Jérôme Polverini, Jean-Claude Guerin, and Martine Storti, *Les modalités de scolarisation des élèves non-francophones nouvellement arrivés en France* (Paris: Ministère de l’éducation nationale, 2002).

35 It should be noted that this might stem from the fact that their original level is lower when they enter the school system, because they do not speak French, making their subsequent progress appear comparatively more spectacular. See Louis-André Vallet and Jean-Paul Caille, ‘Les élèves étrangers ou issus de l’immigration dans l’école et le collège français: Une étude d’ensemble’, *Les dossiers d’Éducation et Formations* 67 (1995), Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale, Paris.

36 Yaël Brinbaum and Annick Kieffer, ‘D’une génération à l’autre, les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: ambition et persévérance’, *Éducation and Formations* 72 (September 2005): 53–75, <http://media.education.gouv.fr/file/90/3/1903.pdf>.

37 Yaël Brinbaum, Laure Moguerou, and Jean-Luc Primon, ‘Les enfants d’immigrés ont des parcours scolaires différenciés selon leur origine migratoire’, in *Immigrés et descendants d’immigrés en France* (Paris: INSEE, 2010): 43–59.

38 Interview with an official in charge of an Educational Achievement Programme in a city outside Paris, 17 April 2013.

b) How do PREs work?

A PRE can only be implemented in a designated Priority Neighbourhood (*quartier prioritaire*).³⁹ Although the number of these neighbourhoods is soon to be reduced to 1,000, it is worth noting what the 2,500 Priority Neighbourhoods consisted of:

- 741 neighbourhoods located in sensitive urban areas (*zones urbaines sensibles*), identified as sensitive because of their degraded housing conditions (most of them housing projects from the 1960s and the 1970s) and high rate of unemployment; and
- 1,751 neighbourhoods located outside of these sensitive areas, ranked by the level of social inequality in the area (measured by income level, the number of social housing units in the area, and the unemployment rate).

All cities with Priority Neighbourhoods signed a contract with the City Ministry in 2007 (renewed in 2009) that commits them to implementing policies that reduce the level of social and spatial inequality in these neighbourhoods. The so-called urban contract for social cohesion (*Contrat urbains de cohesion sociale*, CUCS) links cities with state policies.

Although cities have to commit to implementing a number of policy priorities that are agreed bilaterally between national and local levels, arguably this allows them to benefit from state money. This boosts city budgets that might be lagging after collecting income and other taxes. However, according to an Acsé official, the mayor in large part decides whether things on the ground actually change or not. It is impossible to receive City Ministry subsidies under a CUCS contract without implementing social programmes, but the mayor is responsible for budget and project implementation and the city staff is responsible for selecting the right partners. A number of resources—such as the association Profession Banlieue—help city administrations implement City Ministry programmes.⁴⁰ This group provides documents and training, and facilitates the exchange of ideas between city officers engaged in CUCS contracts.

According to the Acsé Director for Education, the success of a PRE is greatly determined by how much attention the local government (the mayor of the city, or the mayor of the *arrondissement*) focuses on the Priority Neighbourhood where it is located.⁴¹ Mayors can decide whether or not to appoint one administrative official to head the programme and facilitate coordination across different areas of public intervention (education, social aid, health, sport, culture). Coordination is much more likely when an administrator is in charge of the process.

PRE takes up 80 per cent of Acsé's budget for education (80 million euros out of 100 million),⁴² of which 90 per cent is spent at the local level. The rest of the education budget is dedicated to four types of action (5 million euros are disbursed to each) that foster children's:

- access to prestigious institutions of higher education through scholarships and project grants;
- access to leading boarding schools (*internats d'excellence*) that were created in 2009 to provide a high standard of education to selected pupils from disadvantaged areas;
- access to civil servant positions; and
- parent-teacher dialogues.

The fourth is more specifically directed toward parents that may not be native speakers of French, although this is not mentioned in the brochure describing the action.⁴³ Moreover, the Acsé direction officer interviewed observed that the efforts aimed at 'opening schools to parents' cover only about 3 per cent of the total need.

c) What are the results?

Although efforts to foster educational achievement in disadvantaged areas seem to have developed new avenues to reducing social inequality, it is very difficult to estimate the proportion of immigrant youth reached. When asked the question, the Acsé Director of Education referred to the high concentration of immigrants and descendants of immi-

39 For more information on Priority Neighbourhoods, see Système d'Information Géographique (SIG), <http://sig.ville.gouv.fr/page/13/geographie-reglementaire>.

40 Profession Banlieue, www.professionbanlieue.org/.

41 Interview with the Acsé Director of Education, Health, and the Prevention of Delinquency, 19 April 2013.

42 Acsé's total budget for 2013 was 319 million euros.

43 L'Acsé, *Programme des interventions*, 22.

grants in certain neighbourhoods, but did not have data about origins. He did mention that local officers had briefed him about some language problems with parents and suggested that some pupils were of immigrant background. Without hard data, such assessments may vary across administrative officials, depending on their levels of concern for immigrant integration.

As mentioned earlier, the reluctance to identify descendants of immigrants in the school population comes from the top decision-making level. It is well entrenched across policy levels, as well as in school practise, as is shown by the following two examples:

- **Example 1.** A DAIC official explained in an interview that his bureau had given some financial support to a number of high schools in a disadvantaged area. He had funded a programme that put school pupils in touch with local entrepreneurs who might mentor them and help them find jobs. Even though the programme was a success (pupils established good connections with their mentors), he was not able to receive any information from the school principal as to whether or not these school pupils were from an immigrant background: ‘This is not information that school principals are willing to collect and/or disclose’.⁴⁴
- **Example 2.** When asked whether or not a programme had reached immigrant children, a city official in a Paris suburb answered that she knew the children who benefited from the programme but that she was not able to disclose this information. She then referred to the high concentration of immigrants in the city, although she acknowledged that some children might be of the French community of travellers and not children of immigrants.⁴⁵

School actors are not inclined to address children’s immigrant backgrounds because they fear it may result in the unconscious practise of discrimination. Meanwhile, sociological studies demonstrate that actors in the education field in France in fact resort to powerful stereotypes based on ethnicity, cultural traits, and religious belonging without acknowledgment.⁴⁶ The official silence on migration-related diversity might contribute to the unofficial development of ethnic and cultural stereotypes.

Although important means have been deployed to foster the educational achievement of disadvantaged youth (the Acsé budget for education amounts to 100 million euros, which is one-third of its total budget), it is not clear how immigrant youth are targeted through these programmes or how many have been brought within their purview. Such impacts may be influenced by the interests of individual staff members in the organisations in charge of setting up cultural and sport activities (as part of the PRE). It seems that language instruction for new arrivals is the only immigrant-centred project considered to be legitimate.

School actors are not inclined to address children’s immigrant backgrounds because they fear it may result in the unconscious practise of discrimination.

B. Employment policy

Although the same level of reluctance to identify descendants of immigrants applies within the field of employment policies, the fact that the workplace has been under scrutiny for discrimination over the past decade allows for the targeting of first- and second-generation immigrant youth in the implementation of public policies. The jurisdiction over antidiscrimination policy was officially transferred from Acsé to DAIC in 2007 (with a total budget of 100 million euros). Yet, the discrimination that first- and second-generation immigrants experience in the workplace leads to some overlap between programmes that are funded by DAIC and those funded by Acsé. At the local level, organisations may receive funding from both.

⁴⁴ Interview with the DAIC Chief of the Bureau for Professional Integration, 26 April 2013.

⁴⁵ Interview with a city official in charge of an educational achievement programme in the Paris suburbs, 17 April 2013.

⁴⁶ Christian Poirer, ‘LORCERIE Françoise, L’école et le défi ethnique: Éducation et intégration’, *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 20, no. 1 (2004): 209–10.

1. Exposing discrimination in the workplace

Although statistical evidence is lacking, a range of indicators show a systemic discrimination pattern in the workplace. For instance, in 1998, 20.1 per cent of young people of North African descent were unemployed after having entered the workforce three years prior, against 10.2 per cent of young people with both parents born in France.⁴⁷ Young people of immigrant descent tend to be in low-skilled jobs, and many have qualifications that exceed their job requirements. They are underrepresented in high-skilled jobs.⁴⁸

A critique of the republican model of integration emerged in the government in the late 1990s. Employment Minister Martine Aubry commissioned a report on discrimination in the workplace for State Councilor Jean-Michel Belorgey.⁴⁹ Soon after, the translation into French law of the European Union's (EU) 2000 Directive on Discrimination in the Workplace⁵⁰ provided the necessary motivation to establish antidiscrimination legislation (until then, the labour code and French legislation in general was designed around the core notion of *equal treatment*, and only a few provisions concerning discrimination and possible reparations were in place). This resulted in the *Anti-Discrimination Law* of 16 November 2001.

In a few years, human resources managers have gone from denying that discrimination exists or that diversity is a legitimate human resource concern, to embracing these notions and changing their own practises.⁵¹ Fear of legal sanctions contributed to this change. The High Authority to Fight against Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE) was created to comply with EU directives and constituted the main institutional innovation in public policies relating to antidiscrimination. EU directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implemented the principle of equal treatment of persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin. In the transposition of the law in France, the following 19 criteria were listed: age; physical appearance; ethnic, racial, religious, or national belonging (real or assumed); health; sexual identity; sexual orientation; pregnancy; family situation; handicap; name; gender; participation in union activities; political opinion; origin; genetic characteristics; and habits.⁵²

Though the European Union helped catalyze the HALDE and France's antidiscrimination policy, the role of the EU directive is rarely discussed (and is not even mentioned on the HALDE website). Not all the European recommendations were followed, however, particularly the use of data on ethnicity in monitoring antidiscrimination policies. HALDE Director Louis Schweitzer (2005-10) argued that discrimination could be evaluated through testing and did not require the collection of such data.⁵³

Since 2001, HALDE has been absorbed into the Office of the Human Rights Defender. It is now the department in charge of anti-discrimination under this office and it continues to issue recommendations that, while not legally binding, do have some influence over employers and public service behaviours. It is now clear to both private and public sector employers that discrimination is unlawful.

2. The policy response to discrimination

In response to the exposure of ethnic discrimination in the workplace, policymakers have implemented incentive tools, such as the Diversity Label, created in 2008 and partly managed by DAIC.⁵⁴ This tool provides an organisation (public or private) with a thorough audit of its human resource practises (recruiting and career evolution) and grants the organ-

47 Dominique Meurs, Ariane Pailhé, and Patrick Simon, 'The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and Their Descendants in France', *Population* (English Edition) 61, nos. 5–6 (2006): 645–82.

48 Ibid.

49 Jean-Michel Belorgey, *Lutter contre les discriminations, Rapport à Madame la ministre de l'emploi et de la solidarité* (Paris: Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité, 1999).

50 European Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions (2002) OJ L269/15.

51 Eléonore Lépinard and Patrick Simon, 'From Integration to Antidiscrimination...to Diversity? Antidiscrimination Policies and Politics in French Workplaces', in *A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship—WP4 Legal Challenges* (Paris: INED, 2008).

52 European Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin (2000) OJ L180/22.

53 *Le Monde*, Louis Schweitzer: Il faut développer l'affirmative action' en France', 6 April 2009.

54 Ministère de l'Intérieur, 'Le label diversité'.

isation the Diversity Label or suggests changes to its practises. The label is valid for four years, upon which it might be renewed after a new audit of practises. In January 2013, 381 organisations received the label, among which were large companies, three ministries, some city administrations, and some smaller companies. In total, it covered 817,000 employees. The Diversity Label focuses on the following criteria:

- the existence of a policy to prevent discrimination in the organisation;
- internal communication strategies that help familiarise employees with discrimination;
- the level of awareness within the organisation to issues of diversity and discrimination in external relations (relationships with clients, outsourcing, etc.); and
- the efficiency with which these measures are implemented.

According to the DAIC Bureau for Professional Integration, which manages the Diversity Label, the programme is a success and has even been identified as a best national practise for antidiscrimination policy in the workplace by the European Commission.⁵⁵ It is an incentive tool that targets services rather than service users (in contrast with HALDE, which provides legal help to victims of discrimination). It is the main programme of the bureau, constituting 70 per cent of its total budget.

3. How relevant are antidiscrimination policies for youth of immigrant origin?

The Diversity Label covers 19 criteria of discrimination, including ethnicity. Thus the specific experience of youth with an immigrant background is conflated with other criteria of unequal treatment (as in the case of the PRE, for which social inequality is conflated with inequality related to immigrant background). The chief of the Bureau for Professional Integration in DAIC acknowledges that most of the complaints that HALDE receives involve ethnic origin. Yet no affirmative action aims to increase the recruitment of people on the basis of ethnic origin (or, it may be noted, of sex). Meanwhile, there is an active policy to encourage employers to recruit more disabled people. Private- and public-sector employers (with more than 20 employees) whose workforces are not at least 6 percent disabled must pay a fine that is proportional to the lack of representation.⁵⁶

The aim behind the Diversity Label is to scrutinise all levels of the recruitment and career evolution processes, and identify unequal treatment where it exists. The focus is thus on *practises* (through audits), rather than on *results* (through data analysis). According to the Bureau for Professional Integration, the label benefits first- and second-generation immigrant youth, even though this cannot be quantified.

A number of programmes funded by Acsé also focus on access to employment.⁵⁷ How many young people of immigrant origin are benefited remains unknown,⁵⁸ but it is interesting to note similarities to programmes implemented by DAIC, in particular the system of mentorship (*parrainage*). This system connects young people to senior professionals (who have experience and networks in a particular field) as a way to foster their familiarity with the market and help them gain contacts that might lead to internships, if not jobs. Meanwhile, companies are encouraged to hire students as interns.⁵⁹ Internship agreements (*convention de stage*) are signed between schools, companies, and students; after two months the company has to pay the intern a minimum of 453 euros a month.⁶⁰

55 Interview with the DAIC Chief of the Bureau for Professional Integration, 26 April 2013.

56 In 2009, 60 per cent of French public and private companies who hired more than 20 employees did not have to pay any contribution because they fulfilled these criteria.

57 L'Acsé, *Programme des interventions*, 23–34.

58 'I created a list of 200 indicators to evaluate the public impact of these programmes: age, gender, type of training, diploma, geographical location, etc. But nothing on immigration' (interview with the Acsé Employment Director, 17 April 2013).

59 Companies of more than 250 employees are obliged to dedicate at least 4 per cent of their payroll to internships or apprenticeships (defined as when a student, enrolled in a study programme, alternates between time spent in school and time spent in a company as part of his or her training).

60 'Decree n° 2008-1344 of 17 December 2008 relatif à la création d'un label en matière de promotion de la diversité et de prévention des discriminations dans le cadre de la gestion des ressources humaines et mise en place d'une commission de labellisation' (*Journal officiel de la République française du 19 décembre 2008*).

The Employment Ministry specifically helps immigrants develop their language and professional skills. Immigrants who are employed legally have a right to professional training (up to 20 hours per year over six years, for a total of 120 hours), including in French as a second language. However, participation requires the agreement of employers, who sometimes dissuade employees from enrolling for fear of raising expectations of promotion within the company.

While Acsé funds mentorship programmes for youth in Priority Neighbourhoods, young people who reside outside these neighbourhoods may have access to the same kind of funding (allocated by the Employment Ministry) through the regional Employment agency (Directions régionales des entreprises, de la concurrence, de la consommation, du travail et de l'emploi, DIRECCTE),⁶¹ or through DAIC if they are newly arrived immigrants.⁶² As a result, one organisation may receive financial aid from various areas of public intervention (such as the city Ministry, interior Ministry, or Employment Ministry), depending on the composition of its beneficiaries (in or outside Priority Neighbourhoods, and with or without French nationality). The budget allocated to employment policy in Acsé is only 44 million euros (out of 319 million euros), which makes sense since the competence for antidiscrimination was transferred from Acsé to DAIC.⁶³

Several NGOs also work to connect young people to jobs. For example, the organisation Mozaïk RH promotes the recruitment of young graduates with an immigrant background.⁶⁴ They use the phrase 'young graduates from diverse backgrounds' (*les jeunes diplômés de la diversité*) to label their target beneficiaries. The organisation liaises with private companies and public institutions to favour the recruitment of young graduates who experience discrimination (including based on sex, handicap, and age).⁶⁵ DAIC, Acsé, and the Education Ministry all support the work of Mozaïk RH that specifically targets immigrant youth and descendants of immigrants, and raises funds for programmes that address the issue of youth employment and immigration.

Mozaïk RH is located in the Paris (Saint Ouen, Saint Denis) and Lyon regions. Other organisations that target young people of immigrant origin at the local level include ADICE (Association pour le développement des initiatives citoyennes) in the Lille region,⁶⁶ and a network of Second Chance Schools (serving dropouts ages 16 to 25) supported by Acsé.⁶⁷

In sum, several factors indicate that immigrants and their descendants encounter discrimination in the workplace. Public services cannot officially target them. However, their specific needs are being addressed by local organisations and networks that receive financial support from DAIC, Acsé, and the Employment Ministry.

C. Social cohesion policy

Although Acsé is the 'Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity', social cohesion has recently been relabeled as a 'social link' (*lien social*) in order to focus intervention on 'small-scale actions at the neighbourhood level'.⁶⁸ This change in nomenclature may also imply that the broader competence of 'social cohesion' is being mainstreamed throughout Acsé. Acsé's Director for Social Cohesion mentioned that, when rearticulating the agency's policy as a 'social link', her service had evaluated local actions for their impact on strengthening social links. In comparison with the other fields of policy intervention under scrutiny in this report (education and employment), social cohesion is the only area of public intervention that is being guided from the bottom up. In other words, social cohesion is not a policy area of its own. Projects to foster it include those supported by Acsé, in consort with local community associations, and rely heavily on nongovernmental actors.

Acsé supports local projects that impact the everyday life of Priority Neighbourhood residents and foster their sense of civic engagement. The civic service initiative targets youth in particular. Former Emmaüs Director Martin Hirsch established this focus in 2010, when he was appointed High Commissioner for Youth at the national level. The initiative places young people ages 16 to 25 in organisations (preferably NGOs) that operate in the fields of culture, humanitarian relief, education, the environment, citizenship, health, and sports. Civic service volunteers work for 6 to 12 months

61 République française, "La Direccte : un interlocuteur unique pour les entreprises," accessed 18 August 2014.

62 Decree n° 2008-1344 of 17 December 2008.

63 Interview with DAIC staff, 26 April 2013.

64 Mozaïk RH, www.mozaikrh.com/.

65 Although the phrase 'diversity' can be regarded as politely concealing the stigma of immigration, it is also used to encompass a wider range of individuals than immigrants, and includes French people from overseas (Martinique, Guadeloupe, Reunion) who may not identify themselves as immigrants but might be the target of discrimination because of their skin colour.

66 Association ADICE, www.adice.asso.fr/.

67 Réseau des Ecoles de la 2e chance en France, www.reseau-e2c.fr/.

68 Interview with the Acsé Director of Youth, Social Link, and Community Outreach, 17 April 2013.

and are paid below minimum wage but receive social benefits. The objective is twofold: young people get professional experience in the nonprofit sector while increasing the human resource capacity of the associations involved (a factor that was actually used to justify the decrease of financial support to associations).

Although the civic service initiative targets youth in general (and is mainly funded through the Youth Ministry), it also ends up impacting immigrant youth in disadvantaged areas due to the involvement of the Acsé Director for Social Cohesion.⁶⁹

To foster social cohesion—or strengthen ‘social links’—Acsé works to increase human resources in local community associations and neighbourhoods through various schemes of subsidised employment contracts. Seventy million euros have been dedicated to Relay Adults (*Adulte relais*), a programme that recruits unemployed adults to serve as facilitators in neighbourhoods (in the areas of social life, access to services, educational activities, and conflicts in the use of public space). The programme increases contacts and interactions at the neighbourhood level while linking unemployed people with jobs. Moreover, 4 million euros are dedicated to the Education and Youth Cooperation Funds (Fonds de coopération de la jeunesse et de l’éducation populaire, or FONJEP) programme, which finances permanent positions in community outreach associations and focuses predominantly on youth employment.

According to Acsé’s Director for Social Cohesion, the agency’s programmes (especially FONJEP) seek to engage young people with an immigrant background, although she has no means to evaluate this outside the high percentage of immigrants in Priority Neighbourhoods. This concern for the immigrant population is not necessarily linked to the specific theme of social cohesion, but might be attributed to the Director’s career path in the FAS (at Picardie, in north Paris) and the contacts she established with organisations that are specifically dedicated to immigrant issues. As such, she referenced the work of FASTI, a longstanding federation of associations that has been organising social action relevant to immigrants and their families since 1962.⁷⁰

In sum, young people are the prime beneficiaries of social cohesion initiatives that link the unemployed with local associations in need of human resources. Immigrant youth are also benefited by these programmes, in large part due to the long-term links established between immigrant associations and Acsé.

III. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING MAINSTREAMING IN FRANCE

Young people of immigrant descent are not a legitimate focus of specific public intervention in France. The targeting of immigrant youth within mainstream policies is dependent on the following factors:

- ***The institutional culture.*** In the field of education policy, for instance, the vision imposed by the Education Ministry extends to all administrative structures in charge of dealing with the school population, and there is no formal recognition of the cultural or religious background of pupils. By contrast, in the field of employment policy, the recent exposure of discrimination in the workplace has fostered more recognition of the particular needs of immigrant youth, at least at the level of local organisations.
- ***Individual career paths.*** Administrative officials previously in charge of issues pertaining to the immigrant population are more likely to target immigrant youth, whereas officials who have not tend to focus on social inequality.

One interviewee mentioned surveys that indicate that young people from disadvantaged areas are equally discriminated in their access to the job market, regardless of whether these youth are descendants of immigrants or of French natives. However, other surveys have shown that discrimination based on ethnicity is more pervasive than that based on origin.⁷¹ The interviewee’s point of view may be biased by his focus on disadvantaged areas, since ethnic discrimination can affect young people with an immigrant background who reside outside these areas. This tends to show that

69 Ibid.

70 Fasti, www.fasti.org/.

71 Cris Beauchemin, Christelle Hamel, Maud Lesné, and Patrick Simon, ‘Discrimination: A Question of Visible Minorities’, *Population and Societies* 466 (April 2010): 1–4.

the transfer from an immigrant-based to a geography-based approach to social inequality may conceal the unique immigration stigma.

Moreover, although administrators repeatedly referred to the high concentration of immigrants and descendants of immigrants in Priority Neighbourhoods, a DAIC representative observed that only 60 per cent of newly arrived immigrants are concentrated in these areas and that the level of dispersion is actually higher than acknowledged. The positive aspect of the geography-based approach is that it allows for different approaches to social inequalities and maintains a high level of scrutiny on specific actions. However, it fails to reach all immigrant populations. Residence (for example, in a Priority Neighbourhood) is now included in the list of 20 criteria recognised by the French law on discrimination, which should provide new avenues for anti-discrimination strategies.

Efforts to counter discrimination and address the specificity of the immigrant experience must be mainstreamed across the administration.

Finally, though local associations may bypass these administrative constraints to implement actions targeting immigrant youth, without national implementation such measures address the needs of only a fraction of the population and often must comply with the republican imperative of keeping cultural differences invisible. For example, the framing of the NGO Mozaïk RH's actions, which conflates discrimination on the basis of origin with other bases, reflects the official political discourse that is imposed by the legal framework and political norms.

Efforts to counter discrimination and address the specificity of the immigrant experience must be mainstreamed across the administration (and not only in the field of employment). There is already an effort to avoid placing the burden of integration on immigrants alone, and to work with the services that cater to immigrant populations (70 per cent of the DAIC budget is allocated to services and 30 per cent to public-oriented programmes). However, as acknowledged by one of the interviewees, budget cuts and Acsé's loss of a formal competence over immigration issues has greatly diminished the agency's leverage when meeting with other public administrators.

WORKS CITED

- L'Acisé. 2013. *Programme des interventions, adopté par le CA de l'Acisé lors de la séance du 20 décembre 2012*. Paris: Ministère délégué à la ville. http://transferts.lacse.fr/PI_VF_BD_avec_couv.pdf.
- Beauchemin, Cris, Christelle Hamel, Maud Lesné, and Patrick Simon. April 2010. Discrimination: A Question of Visible Minorities. *Population and Societies* 466: 1–4.
- Belorgey, Jean-Michel. 1999. *Lutter contre les discriminations, Rapport à Madame la ministre de l'emploi et de la solidarité*. Paris: Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité.
- Borrel, Catherine and Bertrand Lhommeau. March 2010. Être né en France d'un parent immigré. Paper no. 1287, Insee Première, Paris. www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/ipweb/ip1287/ip1287.pdf.
- Bouvier, Gérard. 2012. Les descendants d'immigrés plus nombreux que les immigrés: une position française originale en Europe. *Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*. Paris: INSEE. www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/ref/IMMFRA12_b_VE_posfra.pdf.
- Brinbaum, Yaël and Annick Kieffer. September 2005. D'une génération à l'autre, les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: ambition et persévérance. *Éducation and Formations* 72: 53–75. <http://media.education.gouv.fr/file/90/3/1903.pdf>.
- Brinbaum, Yaël, Laure Moguerou, and Jean-Luc Primon. 2010. Les enfants d'immigrés ont des parcours scolaires différenciés selon leur origine migratoire. *Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France*, 43–59. Paris: INSEE.
- Darès. 2009. Habiter en ZUS et être immigré: un double risque sur le marché du travail. *Premières Informations et Premières Synthèses* 48 (1), 1–10.
- Decree n° 2008-1344 of 17 December 2008 relatif à la création d'un label en matière de promotion de la diversité et de prévention des discriminations dans le cadre de la gestion des ressources humaines et mise en place d'une commission de labellisation. *Journal officiel de la République française du 19 décembre 2008*.
- European Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin (2000) OJ L180/22.
- European Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions (2002) OJ L269/15.
- Glasman, Dominique. 2000. *Des Zones d'Education Prioritaires aux Réseaux d'Education Prioritaire: Pratiques et Politiques*. Toulouse: SEDRAP.
- Ireland, Patrick. 1994. *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Le Monde*. 2009. Louis Schweitzer: Il faut développer l'«affirmative action» en France. 6 April 2009.
- Lecourbe, Anne, Jérôme Polverini, Jean-Claude Guerin, and Martine Storti. May 2002. *Les modalités de scolarisation des élèves non-francophones nouvellement arrivés en France*. Paris: Ministère de l'éducation nationale.
- Lépinard, Eléonore and Patrick Simon. 2008. From Integration to Antidiscrimination...to Diversity? Antidiscrimination Policies and Politics in French Workplaces. In *A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship French Report—WP4 Legal Challenges*. Paris: INED.
- Lessault, David and Cris Beauchemin. January 2009. Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe: Still a Limited Trend. *Population and Societies* 452 (1): 1–4.

- L'Office français de l'intégration et de l'immigration. Le CAI: le contrat d'accueil et d'intégration. Un engagement réciproque entre le Migrant et la République. Accessed 8 August 2014. www.ofii.fr/accueil_8/le_cai_le_contrat_d_accueil_et_d_integration_un_engagement_reciproque_entre_le_migrant_et_la_republique_984.html.
- Lyons, Amelia. 2009. Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonisation in France: The Case of the Fonds d'Action Sociale. *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (1): 65–89.
- Meurs, Dominique, Ariane Pailhé, and Patrick Simon. 2006. The Persistence of Intergenerational Inequalities Linked to Immigration: Labour Market Outcomes for Immigrants and their Descendants in France. *Population (English Edition)* 61 (5–6): 645–82.
- Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale. March 2012. Les élèves nouveaux arrivants non francophones. Note d'information [Informative Note] no. 12-01, Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, Paris. http://cache.media.education.gouv.fr/file/2012/53/2/DEPP-NI-2012-01-eleves-nouveaux-arrivants-non-francophones_209532.pdf.
- Ministère de l'Intérieur. March 2013. *Le label diversité*. Paris: Ministère de l'Intérieur. www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Integration/Emploi-et-promotion-de-la-diversite/Le-label-diversite.
- National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO). INED-INSEE, Paris. http://teo_english.site.ined.fr/.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2013. *International Migration Outlook 2013*. Paris: OECD Publishing. www.oecd.org/els/mig/imo2013.htm.
- Palier, Bruno and Giuliano Bonoli. 1999. Phénomènes de Path Dependence et réformes des systèmes de protection sociale. *Revue française de science politique* 49 (3): 399–420.
- Poiret, Christian. 2004. LORCERIE Françoise, L'école et le défi ethnique: Éducation et intégration. *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 20 (1): 209–10.
- Simon, Patrick. 1999. Nationality and Origins in French Statistics: Ambiguous Categories. *Population: An English Selection* 11: 193–219.
- _____. 2008. The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France. *French Politics, Culture and Society* 26 (1): 7–31.
- Vallet, Louis-André and Jean-Paul Caille. 1996. Les élèves étrangers ou issus de l'immigration dans l'école et le collège français: Une étude d'ensemble. *Les dossiers d'Éducation et Formations* 67, Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, Paris.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Angéline Escafré-Dublet is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Lyon 2, and has been a Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Race, Politics, and Culture (University of Chicago); the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris; the Centre for International Research and Studies (Sciences Po); and the Lab'Urba (University Paris Est). She has overseen the research for the French portion of three successive European Union-funded projects: EMILIE (on multicultural citizenship), ACCEPT Pluralism (on the challenge of cultural and religious diversity), and DIVERCITIES (on the urban governance of diversity). Her research focuses on immigration issues and the way they relate to matters of politics and culture.

Dr. Escafré-Dublet is the author of *Culture et Immigration. De la question sociale à l'enjeu politique (1958-2007)* and *Immigration et politiques culturelles*, and has published articles in *Diversities*, the *Journal of Modern European History*, *Genèses*, *Histoire@Politique*, *Raison politique*, and *Annales de démographie historiques*. She co-authored, with Patrick Simon, a book chapter entitled "Ethnic Statistics in Europe: The Paradox of Colourblindness" in the volume *European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges*.

She holds a PhD in modern history from Sciences Po, Paris.



Migration Policy Institute Europe, established in Brussels in 2011, is a non-profit, independent research institute that aims to provide a better understanding of migration in Europe and thus promote effective policymaking. Building upon the experience and resources of the Migration Policy Institute, which operates internationally, MPI Europe provides authoritative research and practical policy design to governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders who seek more effective management of immigration, immigrant integration, and asylum systems as well as successful outcomes for newcomers, families of immigrant background, and receiving communities throughout Europe. MPI Europe also provides a forum for the exchange of information on migration and immigrant integration practices within the European Union and Europe more generally.

www.MPIEurope.org

Residence Palace
155 Rue de la Loi
5th Floor
1040 Brussels
Belgium

Phone: +32 (2) 235 2113